Introduction

In the last two weeks of October 1962, the world came closer to nuclear warfare than it ever has. For 14 tense days, United States President John F Kennedy and Soviet Premiere Nikita Kruschev stood eyeball to eyeball, each with his hand on the nuclear trigger. In the end, both sides blinked.

The object of contention was the island of Cuba.  Ruled by the dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba had been the vacation hotspot of the Caribbean, with wealthy American tourists and jetsetters lounging at the opulent casinos and hotels in Havana.  In 1959, however, a Cuban lawyer named Fidel Castro, at the head of a band of bearded guerrillas, succeeded in overthrowing Batista.  At first, the US looked on in benign neglect, considering it as just another Latin dictator being overthrown by his own people.  By 1960, however, Castro declared himself a socialist, nationalized and confiscated American-owned property in Cuba, and openly allied with the Soviet Union. 

In the midst of the Cold War, the United States could not allow the Russians to have a base so close to the US, and the CIA began a whole series of efforts to overthrow Castro and install a pro-US strongman again.  Some of the CIA’s efforts were, quite frankly, nutty—including a plot to dust Castro with a powder that would make his beard fall out, and another plot to spike his drink with LSD so he would give an incoherent speech and discredit himself.  Far more deadly in intention, however, were the various plans carried out jointly with the American Mafia (which had owned all the confiscated Cuban casinos) to assassinate Castro. When President Kennedy took office in 1961, the CIA already had a covert plan to use an army of Cuban exiles to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and provoke a popular uprising to oust Castro.  The plan failed disastrously, and the entire brigade was killed or captured.

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs failure, the US military carried out a constant surveillance of Cuba, launching periodic overflights using the U-2 spy plane.  The US announced an economic embargo against Cuba in February 1962, and in September 1961, Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of American military force in Cuba if American interests were threatened. The Pentagon planned a large-scale military exercise in the Caribbean to take place in October 1962.

To the Soviet Union and Cuba, all signs seemed to point to an imminent American invasion. Determined not to lose his only base in the Western Hemisphere, Kruschev decided to send large amounts of military supplies to Cuba, including MiG jet fighters, IL-28 bombers, anti-aircraft surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, and other arms. And, in a calculated move, he also decided to introduce medium and long-range nuclear missiles.

The arrival in Cuba of growing amounts of Soviet military hardware was detected by the US in early October, 1962, and increased U-2 overflights and satellite reconnaissance were ordered.  On October 14, a U-2 flight photographed what was clearly a Soviet SS-4 nuclear missile site. Subsequent spy planes detected SS-5 sites. There were also long-range Ilyushin bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the United States. The Cuban Missile Crisis had begun—though at this time everything was kept secret and the American public had no idea it was now under a nuclear gun.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended the bombing and immediate invasion of Cuba, but the political leadership countered that this would provoke the Soviets to invade West Berlin, and lead to world war.  Instead, it was decided by Kennedy to impose a naval “quarantine” on Cuba, in which ships from the American Navy and from various Latin American countries would stop all inbound vessels and search them for missiles. Kennedy was gambling that the Soviet Union would not use force to prevent their ships from being stopped. At the time, the President did not know that the Russian ships were being escorted by Soviet attack submarines.  He also did not know that (as recently declassified Soviet documents later revealed), in addition to the missiles, the USSR had already placed a number of active tactical nuclear weapons, including aerial bombs and short-range rockets, in Cuba and had authorized their use, under restricted circumstances, in the event of an American invasion.  The nuclear abyss was far closer than either side realized at the time.

Although Kennedy had attacked the Eisenhower-Nixon administration during the campaign for supposedly allowing a dangerous “missile gap” to develop, giving the Russians a chance for nuclear superiority, when he became President, Kennedy learned the actual reality—it was the United States who had a huge advantage. The US possessed some 5,000 nuclear weapons capable of reaching Russia, while the Soviets had fewer than 350, including the 40 launchers in Cuba, that could reach America. Nevertheless, even 350 nuclear weapons would be enough to remove the United States as a functional society. If the Cuban Missile Crisis led to full-scale nuclear war, the results would be catastrophic.

 On October 22, over a week after the missile sites had been found, Kennedy broke the secrecy and, in a televised address, told the nation about the missiles and about the naval quarantine. It would take about three more days for the approaching Soviet freighters to reach Cuba. Messages from the Soviet Union declared that the “blockade” was illegal and that Soviet ships had been instructed to ignore it.

On October 25, the American military was placed at DEFCON 2 (“Defense Condition 2”, the step immediately preceding full-scale war).

That same day, at the United Nations Security Council, the Soviet ambassador to the UN denied that the USSR had placed any missiles in Cuba (like the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, he had not been told of their existence by Moscow).  This prompted US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to produce the U-2 aerial photographs of the missile bases.

The next day, a crucial incident occurred that was not revealed until the Soviet archives later became available to researchers. The destroyer USS Beale had tracked a Soviet submarine, the B-39, in the quarantine zone and, when it refused to surface, dropped a number of depth charges. Unknown to the Americans, the B-39, a “Foxtrot” class attack sub, was armed with a nuclear torpedo, and was under orders to use it if attacked. With its batteries almost dead and American depth charges exploding all around, the submarine faced a stark choice—either surface and be vulnerable to American fire, or attack immediately. According to Soviet accounts, the sub’s captain, Valentin Savitsky, and the commander of the local sub fleet, Vasili Arkhipov, argued furiously, with the Captain going so far as to activate and load the nuclear torpedo before finally deciding to surface. It was a decision that single-handedly prevented World War Three.

On October 27, a surface-to-air missile shot down an American U-2 over Cuba, killing the pilot.  War seemed imminent. The US began moving troops and aircraft for the planned bombing and invasion of Cuba, and also placed its forces worldwide on notice to prepare for nuclear war if the Russians responded with military force.

During this time, a flurry of diplomatic action was happening behind the scenes. On October 25, newsman John Scali of ABC was contacted by Soviet diplomat Alexander Formin (who was in reality the KGB Station Chief in Washington) to ask Scali to use his government contacts to sound out a proposal – the USSR would withdraw its missiles from Cuba if the US in turn agreed not to invade Cuba. Later that same day, a message arrived from Kruschev (now known as “the first message”) offering the same solution.

The next day, however, while the Americans were considering this offer, a “second message” arrived from Kruschev, now declaring that the USSR would remove its missiles from Cuba only if the United States removed its own intermediate-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. Although the US had itself already begun making inquiries to its allies about making a similar proposal, this new message indicated a hardening of the Soviet attitude, and Kennedy pessimistically concluded that war was now all but certain. But in a last-ditch desperate attempt, Kennedy decided to simply ignore the “second message” entirely and instead respond to Kruschev’s first offer, agreeing that the US would make a no-invasion pledge in exchange for the UN-supervised removal of the missiles. To everyone’s relief, Kruschev agreed to talk.

With this breakthrough, the crisis broke.  On October 28, Kruschev announced that the missiles would be withdrawn. In exchange, the United States announced that it would not invade Cuba or interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs. And, in a separate diplomatic agreement that was never announced publicly, the US also agreed to withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy.

By November, the crisis was over. The only one not happy with the terms of its resolution was Fidel Castro, who had not been consulted by anyone during the entire negotiation. 

The documents that follow are the declassified versions from both American and Soviet archives. They trace the history of the crisis from the discovery of the Soviet weapons in Cuba to the Kennedy-Kruschev agreement.

Timeline of the Cuban Missile Crisis

1962

July 26; Castro announces that the USSR is helping him defend Cuba, and declares that an American attack would produce “world war”.

August 10; The CIA, after monitoring the movement of Soviet cargo ships in the Black Sea, tells Kennedy that the Soviets may be attempting to ship nuclear missiles overseas, probably to Cuba.

August 29; U-2 photos reveal SAM anti-aircraft sites at the locations where the missiles will later be found. Construction of the missile launch site has not yet begun.

August 31; Senator Keating tells the White House that there is information that missile bases are being constructed in Cuba. Keating’s information apparently came from the CIA, who in turn got it from Cuban exiles.

September 4; Kennedy talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin about the military buildup in Cuba. Dobrynin assures Kennedy that the weapons are defensive and that no Soviet missiles will be deployed in Cuba.

September 7; The Pentagon begins formulating contingency plans for military action in Cuba.

September 27; Contingency plans for US military intervention in Cuba are finalized.

September 28; Aerial photos of Russian ships bound for Cuba show large crates on their decks, containing nuclear-capable IL-28 bombers.

October 1; Analysts inform McNamara that there are indications of missile bases being constructed in western Cuba. McNamara orders the joint chiefs to draw up contingency plans for airstrikes against Cuba and a naval blockade.

October 9; Kennedy orders U-2 flight over Cuba to look for evidence of missiles.  Weather delays the flight until October 14.

October 14; The U-2 flight takes aerial photos of western Cuba.

October 15; Morning; Photo-analysts identify Soviet SS-4 medium-range missiles and launchers in the photos. They are capable of reaching the southeastern United States, but do not yet appear to be operational.

Afternoon; The CIA is informed of the photos, but Director John McCone is on a plane and out of contact.  The photo-analysts are asked to consult with missile experts to confirm their conclusions.

Late evening; The photos are shown to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. They decide to wait until morning, when they have better information to present, before telling the President.

October 16; 0845; Bundy tells the President of the missiles. Claiming a cold, Kennedy returns to the White House.

1145; Kennedy calls a meeting of top-level advisors (the “Executive Committee” or “ExComm”) to discuss the matter. Military options are discussed. More U-2 flights are ordered.

1830; The ExComm meets again. More discussion on military options.

October 17; Morning; Photo-analysts identify Soviet SS-5 intermediate-range missile launchers. They can reach virtually the entire continental US. These launchers too do not yet appear to be operational, and no actual missiles can be seen.

Afternoon; The idea of a “surgical strike” to take out the missile sites is rejected as impractical. Opinion divides between a fullscale invasion and a naval blockade.

October 18; 1100; ExComm debates airstrikes, followed by invasion.

1430; Debate over blockade. Airstrike and invasion is seen by some as immoral. President Kennedy also leans toward blockade.

1700; Kennedy has a pre-scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, concerning a possible visit to the US by Kruschev in 1963. Gromyko is unaware that missiles have been placed in Cuba, and Kennedy does not tell him he knows about the missiles.

2100; ExComm meeting.  By now, most administration officials favor the blockade (called a “quarantine”).

October 19; 1100; ExComm forms two working groups, one each to explore the airstrike/invasion and blockade options.

Early afternoon; The two teams meet and discuss.  The blockade option wins out.

Evening; Discussion centers on probable Soviet reaction to various options.

October 20; 0900; Work begins on TV speech to be made by Kennedy about the crisis.

1430; Kennedy rejects the military plans and adopts the blockade plan.  TV speech is scheduled for October 22. Adlai Stevenson brings up the idea of withdrawing Jupiter missiles in Turkey as part of a settlement deal. Kennedy decides it is too soon to be making such concessions.

Evening; The Bureau Chief of the New York Times asks several administration officials what all the secret meeting is about.  He is given a partial briefing, and is asked for national security reasons not to run a story.

The CIA estimates that about 16 of the SS-4 missiles in Cuba are now operational.

October 21; 1000; Kennedy formally approves the blockade plan. Press Secretary Pierre Salinger is told for the first time about the crisis.

1130; Tactical Air Command General Sweeney briefs the President, telling him that he cannot guarantee that an air strike would take out all the missiles. Kennedy directs Sweeney to be prepared for air action if the blockade fails.

1430; Admiral George Anderson briefs the National Security Council about the blockade plan. It is determined that any ship attempting to run the blockade will have its rudder shot off to disable it.

Several newspaper reporters now have pieced together most of the story—they are asked by the White House to withhold publication until after the president’s TV address.

October 22; 1055; American Ambassadors around the world are instructed to brief friendly governments in the UK, West Germany, France and elsewhere, about the missiles and the planned “quarantine”.

  1200; The Strategic Air Command begins placing its B-47 and  B-52 nuclear bombers on alert.

1700; Congressional leaders from both parties are briefed at the White House on the missile crisis.

1800; Secretary of State Rusk gives Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin an advance copy of the President’s speech.

1900; President Kennedy tells the nation about the missile crisis.

October 23; 1906; President Kennedy formally signs the order for the naval quarantine. Low-level reconnaissance flights begin over Cuba. Moscow raises the military preparedness of its forces.

1930; Robert Kennedy is told by Ambassador Dobrynin that there are no missiles in Cuba, and that Soviet ships have orders to defy the US blockade.

2215; The blockade line is drawn in closer to Cuba, from 800 miles to 500 miles, to give the Soviets more time to consider their position.

October 24; Early morning; All but one of the Soviet ships en route to Cuba are reported to have reversed course. Later, it is determined that at least three Russian ships are approaching the quarantine zone. Soviet submarines are also reported in the area.

1000; The quarantine officially goes into effect.

1025; Two Russian ships at the quarantine zone are intercepted by the USS Essex. They stop. Kennedy orders no further interceptions to be made for one hour, until the situation is clear. No Russian ships attempt to run the blockade.

1925; Kruschev sends a message to Kennedy declaring that the blockade is illegal and he has instructed his ships not to respect it. 

October 25; 0715; The Soviet ship Bucharest, which is not believed to be carrying military equipment, is allowed to pass through the blockade without being stopped.

Afternoon; American UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson presents aerial photographs of the Cuban missile sites to the UN Security Council.

1700; Intelligence briefing indicates that work is accelerating on the missile sites and more SS-4 missiles might now be operational. US forces are placed at DEFCON 2, and permission is given to load live nuclear weapons aboard US aircraft.

October 26; The Russian submarine B-36 is depth-charged by American destroyers and surfaces.

1300; American reporter John Scali is contacted by a Russian diplomat and is asked to determine from his government contacts whether the US would be interested in a diplomatic effort to trade removal of the Cuba missiles in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.

1800; “The first message” arrives from Kruschev, offering a missile withdrawal in exchange for a no-invasion promise.

October 27; 0900; “The second message” arrives from Kruschev, declaring that the missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba only if corresponding American missiles were taken out of Turkey and Italy.

1200; An American U-2 plane is shot down by a SAM anti-aircraft missile over Cuba.  A second reconnaissance plane is damaged by antiaircraft fire.

1600; During a briefing, Kennedy receives word that the U-2 had been shot down. He decides not to retaliate, but orders that if any more planes are attacked, the SAM sites would be bombed.

1615; ABC reporter Scali meets again with Soviet KGB Section Chief Formin, asking why the offer from Kruschev suddenly changed.  Formin blames it on “miscommunication”.

1945; Robert Kennedy meets with Ambassador Dobrynin and offers to remove American missiles from Turkey and Italy in exchange for removal of the missiles in Cuba.

2005; President Kennedy sends a letter to Kruschev confirming the missile deal.

October 28; 0600; CIA reports that all 24 SS-4 missiles in Cuba are now operational. Although work is proceeding on the SS-5 sites, no actual SS-5 missiles seem to have entered Cuba yet.

0900; Kruschev send message accepting the missile-trade solution.  The US publicly pledges not to invade Cuba, and secretly pledges to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. The crisis ends.

1700; Soviet technicians begin to dismantle the Cuban missiles.

The Documents 

Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum

Washington, January 19, 1961.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA

19 January 1961

1. Mr. Willauer presented the highlights of a paper which he had prepared following meetings of the special contingency planning group. He concluded that several major aspects of the overall plan require clarification or further decision, citing the following: (a) the use of U.S. air bases for strikes before and after D-Day, (b) staging of the invasion force, possibly from the U.S., (c) specific action, including timing, to get support of other Latin American countries, (d) how and when to recognize a provisional government, (e) the possibility of having to provide considerably more overt support than originally planned.

2. Mr. Dulles noted that the next ten-day period poses a number of problems from the standpoint of policy approval. In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes said we are not planning specific overflights in the immediate future but urged that we be in a position to service requests as quickly as possible. The Group agreed that dispatches by sea can be continued without further approval at this time. It was also agreed that a high level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and of Defense should be arranged as soon as possible to reaffirm basic concepts.

3. Mr. Merchant said that the Department of Justice is not now prepared to take any action against Masferrer. The Group agreed this seemed reasonable under the circumstances.

4. Mr. Merchant reported the opinion of Assistant Secretary Mann that President Ydigoras may be overthrown in the next few days, perhaps by leftists in the Army or Air Force. Mann had urged that it be agreed that no Cuban trainees be placed at the disposal of Ydigoras and that plans for evacuation on very short notice be firmed up. It was noted that Mr. Mann and Col. King are in close touch on this matter.