Editor’s Preface

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the longest-running disputes in world history. It has produced over half a dozen wars and armed incursions, several uprisings and rebellions, the dislocation of huge numbers of refugees, decades of terrorist bombings and shootings, numerous peace plans, and the introduction of chemical and nuclear weapons into the world’s most volatile region. For the Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis, intense nationalism and deep religious emotions on both sides often make rational dialogue all but impossible; for the rest of the world, crucial economic interests are at stake.

As with so many modern world conflicts, the Arab-Israeli dispute is the result of 19^th century European imperialism. In the Middle East, the European powers unilaterally decided the borders of newly-created nations, and, sitting comfortably in Paris or London, arbitrarily drew their lines on a map based solely on their own national interests, regardless of traditional ethnic or tribal boundaries or the actual situation on the ground.  The result has been 100 years of strife.

Modern European involvement in the Middle East was a direct result of the military needs of the First World War. In 1914, most of the Arab world had been under the control of the Turkish Ottoman Empire since the end of the medieval Crusades. The Arabs chafed under Ottoman rule, while the area was virtually ignored by most Europeans—with one notable exception.  In the latter half of the 19^th century, a political and social movement called “Zionism”, led by Theodore Herzl, appeared among European Jews. The goal of Zionism was to establish a Jewish homeland in the historical region of Israel, around Jerusalem. European Jews were encouraged to emigrate to the area around Jerusalem, purchase land from the Turks, and establish an autonomous Jewish homeland. Jewish settlers from Europe and Russia (where anti-Semitism was rampant) grew in numbers. They formed large collective farms known as “kibbutz”, and established a number of Jewish towns, including Tel Aviv.

When World War One broke out in 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined with Germany and Austria-Hungary against France and Britain. After a British attempt to invade Turkey and take it out of the war failed at Gallipoli, the Allies sent British army officer T.E. Lawrence to the Arab tribes to organize a rebellion.  Lawrence’s guerrilla war tied down large numbers of Turkish troops, and he became known to history as “Lawrence of Arabia”. Lawrence’s contacts with the Arabs led to diplomatic correspondence between the British government and the Arab leadership at Mecca, the MacMahon-Hussein Correspondence, in which the British offered an independent Arab nation after the war, in exchange for Arab help in fighting the Turks.

Instead, England and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1915, dividing up the Arab world between themselves as colonial powers. Both Lawrence and the Arab leaders felt betrayed, and Arab-British relations soured. The French and British interest in the area was military—modernized European naval fleets had only recently switched from coal-power to oil-power, and the Arabic region was known to have large oil deposits. The economic oil interests of the Western world would dominate Middle East politics for the next 100 years.

At the same time that Lawrence and the Arabs were waging guerrilla warfare, the Jewish settlers near Jerusalem organized their own military unit under Ze’ev Jabotinsky to fight the Turks. As the Zionist movement gained political influence in Europe and particularly in Russia, the English government decided to approach it as another ally. This became especially important after the March 1917 Russian Revolution removed the Tsarist government, and the British were desperate for a way to keep the Russians in the war. As a result, in 1917 the British foreign ministry issued the Balfour Declaration, which supported the goal of an independent Jewish state at the end of the war.  Within three years, the British had now promised the same piece of land—which wasn’t Britain’s to begin with—to three different authorities.

In 1918, Arab Sharif Faisal and Chaim Weizmann of the World Zionist Organization agreed to support each other’s claim to statehood, with the Sharif of Mecca establishing an Arab kingdom, and Palestine becoming a Jewish homeland. As part of the agreement, the settlement of Jews from Europe and Russia in Palestine was to be encouraged, and the Jewish homeland would give economic assistance to the future Arab kingdom. Faisal added the proviso that the agreement would only go into effect when the Arabs were given an independent state in Syria and Iraq. Instead, the Sykes-Picot treaty divided most Arab lands between France and Britain. The Arabs declared the Faisal-Weizmann agreement void.

By 1922, moreover, frictions had begun to appear, as both sides argued over the terms implied in the MacMahon letters and the Balfour declaration. In June 1922 the British Government released a White Paper “clarifying” its position, but this paper only added to the confusion. The White Paper declared that it had only been the intention of the Balfour Declaration to form an autonomous Jewish homeland within Palestine, not a separate Jewish State. On the other hand, the White Paper also declared that the MacMahon agreement for an independent Arab Kingdom did not include the area of Palestine, and that Palestine should be administered internationally by the League of Nations. And in fact in 1922 the British Government was issued a Mandate to administrate Palestine in trust for the League. Under the Mandate, Jewish immigration into Palestine was greatly accelerated. In 1922, Jews made up 11 percent of the population of Palestine, and with the rise of the Nazis in Europe, this had increased to 17 percent in 1931. The Arabs were particularly angered when the Jewish community banned the employment of Palestinians in Jewish-owned farms and businesses.

In 1936, the Palestinian Arabs broke out in riots, directed both at local Jews and at the British Mandate. To protest economic discrimination against Palestinians, a general strike was called from April to October. Demonstrators targeted the British policy of preferential Jewish immigration, and demanded an independent Palestinian nation. Rebels repeatedly bombed the newly-built British oil pipeline from Iraq, and sabotaged train tracks.

The British responded with curfews, mass imprisonment (without charges or trial), and by demolishing the houses of rebels (sometimes entire villages were razed to the ground). The Jewish community formed a paramilitary group called the Haganah, which received the unofficial cooperation of the British. A splinter group from Haganah, called the Irgun Zvai Leumi, carried out terrorist attacks on both Arab rebels and on British Mandate figures, hoping to produce an independent Jewish State.

The Arab Revolt and the Jewish response to it ended any chance of a bi-cultural state of Palestine, and the British, now attacked by both sides, began looking for a way out. In 1936, the Peel Commission was formed, and it recommended that the area of the British Mandate be partitioned into two independent states, one Jewish, the other Palestinian. In 1939, the British released another White Paper, renouncing the aim of an autonomous Jewish community within Palestine, as envisioned by Balfour, and also rejecting the idea of partition as impractical. Instead, Jews would simply become ordinary citizens of the state of Palestine, and immigration would be sharply curtailed.

The new British policy did not help.  The number of Jewish immigrants in Palestine continued to grow throughout World War Two—most of these were illegal immigrants who were fleeing the Nazis. The Jewish community resented the British effort to stem the flow of refugees into Palestine. The Arab leaders, in turn, also no longer trusted the British, and several of them made friendly overtures to the Nazis and Fascists. When the British tried to mediate negotiations between Jewish and Arab leaders, the Arabs refused to meet face-to-face with the Jewish representatives, and refused even to use the same entrance in the building. Calls began anew for an independent Palestine, with some Arabs wanting to expel all the illegal Jewish immigrants, and others wanting to expel all Jews, illegal or not.

In 1947, the British passed on the mess they had created to the newly-formed United Nations. The Special Committee on Palestine recommended a partition plan, forming independent Jewish and Palestinian states, with Jerusalem as a neutral international city, and this was adopted in UN Resolution 181. The Arab leadership, which had organized itself into an Arab League, rejected the idea.

As the mandate expired on May 14, 1948, the State of Israel declared its independence and claimed sovereignty over the territory granted to it under the UN partition plan. The Arab League, in response, invaded. In what the Israelis refer to as the “War of Independence”, the Haganah militia became the core of the Israeli Defense Forces, while the terrorist group Irgun and its offshoot, the Stern Gang, carried out massacres and bombings in an effort to drive the Arabs out. The Arab armies were soundly beaten, and Israel found itself in possession not only of its partitioned territory, but also a part of Palestine’s partitioned share. The 1949 peace treaty set this as the recognized legal border of the State of Israel.

In the aftermath of the 1948 War, a flood of Palestinian refugees left the newly Israeli territory and settled in makeshift camps in Jordan.  The United Nations passed Resolution 194, granting these refugees the right to return to their homes in Israeli territory or, failing that, to be compensated for the land and possessions they had lost. Meanwhile, several Arab states retaliated by passing laws restricting the rights of Jews in their territory or in some cases depriving Jews of citizenship or confiscating their property, resulting in a flow of immigrants into Israel from neighboring Arab nations. The small number of Palestinians remaining in Israel, by contrast, (currently about 20% of Israel’s population) were granted Israeli citizenship (though they were restricted by martial law until 1966).

In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and closed it to all Israeli shipping, a move that brought about a secret pact between France, Britain and Israel to seize the canal. Under the agreement, Israel would invade the Sinai and take the canal, France and Britain would then intervene, ask both Israel and Egypt to withdraw, and then hold the canal themselves.

In October 1956, Israeli forces seized the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. French and British troops soon followed. The operation was, however, opposed by the United States—the Eisenhower Administration, fearing that a Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt would lead to war with NATO, introduced resolutions in the UN calling for a ceasefire—which were vetoed by Britain and France. In response, the US supported a Canadian resolution calling for UN peacekeeping forces to hold the canal. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, with US support, placed an embargo on oil to France and Britain. The war ended when UN troops occupied the Egyptian bank of the Suez Canal (the Israelis refused to allow any UN troops on the Sinai side). Israel then withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza. Egypt agreed to the demilitarization of the Sinai, and a few thousand UN troops were kept to patrol the demilitarized area.

 In May 1967, however, Egypt, under the leadership of Gamel Abdul Nasser, formed an alliance with Syria and Jordan. Each made military moves towards the Israeli borders, and Egypt expelled the UN troops from the Sinai. In a pre-emptive strike on June 5, 1967, Israeli fighters knocked out most of the Arab air forces on the ground, and in the six days of fighting that followed, the Israelis seized control of the Sinai and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

The Six Day War was a pivotal event in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The Occupied Territories contained huge numbers of Palestinian refugees who had fled the 1948 War and who now were under the direct control of Israel. The United Nations, in Resolution 242, called on Israel to leave the conquered territories and withdraw back to the pre-1967 borders, but instead the Israeli government turned the Occupied Territories into virtual colonies, holding the Palestinians inside camps that have been called “the largest open-air prisons in the world”, illegally moving large numbers of Jewish settlers into the seized areas, and using a repressive occupation to keep the Palestinians in line.

In response to the 1967 War, the Arab League issued what has been called the “Three No’s Policy”—no recognition of Israel, no peace with Israel, and no negotiation with Israel.

The Palestinians living in the occupied camps, however, soon tired of waiting for the inept efforts of the Arab states to free them, and took up guerrilla fighting and terrorist actions to force the Israelis to leave. The largest of these paramilitary groups was Al Fatah, formed by Palestinian lawyer Yassir Arafat. In 1968, a number of Palestinian groups united to form the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under Arafat’s leadership. The PLO issued the Palestinian National Charter in 1968, calling for the destruction of the state of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestine on its territory.

For the next 20 years, Palestinian fighters, known as “fedayeen”, carried out guerrilla raids, bombings and terrorist attacks around the world against Israel and its supporters (including the United States). In October 1973, in the Yom Kippur War, Syria and Egypt tried once again to crush Israel militarily, and were again beaten back by the Israeli Defense Forces. In UN Resolution 338, calling for an end to the fighting, the United Nations once again pointed out that Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territory was illegal and called for a return to the pre-1967 borders.

In 1974, the Palestine National Council, recognizing that a military victory over Israel was virtually impossible, declared that it would establish a Palestinian state in any area that it was able to liberate, thereby taking a step-by-step approach to the establishment of Palestine.

The United Nations, meanwhile, passed resolutions affirming the right of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to defend themselves and to free themselves from occupation, and granted the PLO’s National Council, as the representative of the Palestinian people, “Observer” status at the UN.  And, in a highly controversial move, the UN adopted a resolution declaring that the policy of Zionism, by attempting to maintain a “Jewish State”, was a form of racism.

It was then that diplomacy stepped in.

Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, multinational talks had been going on in Geneva to try to solve the decades-long impasse and bring a settlement between Israel and the Arab countries. When these talks went nowhere, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, frustrated by his Soviet patrons and his Arab colleagues, eager for improved relations with the West, and looking for a way out of economic troubles, took the extraordinary act of making an official state visit to Israel in 1977 and made a speech to the Israeli Knesset, tacitly recognizing the legitimacy of the state of Israel. This led to a secret series of bilateral talks, culminating in the Camp David Accords, signed in the United States in 1978. In the Accords, Egypt—the most powerful and influential of the Arab nations—officially recognized Israel and agreed to peace and normalized relations, in exchange for the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.  The Gaza Strip was to remain under Israeli control, with the understanding that it would become part of any future Palestinian state.

Other Arab states fiercely condemned the Egyptian peace (and Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Muslim extremists in 1981 in retaliation for it). But the diplomatic wall had been breached, and within a decade, nearly every Arab nation had, either explicitly or tacitly, given up its campaign against Israel. By 1982, the Arab-Israeli conflict centered almost exclusively around the Palestinians and Arafat’s PLO.

In the late 1960’s, the PLO had established a virtual state within a state in Jordan, which it used as a base from which to launch guerrilla attacks on Israel. In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan decided to take his own country back, and in a massive military campaign, he forced the PLO camps out of his territory, an event known to Palestinian fighters as “Black September”. The PLO moved into southern Lebanon, where its ally Syria had already taken advantage of the Lebanese civil wars to take control of parts of the country.

From this new base, the PLO continued to launch guerrilla and terror attacks on Israel.  On the diplomatic front, the United Nations adopted resolutions in 1979 and 1980, re-affirming that Israel’s continuing occupation was illegal, condemning the construction of Jewish settlements in the conquered areas, and declaring Israel’s control over Jerusalem to be “null and void”.

In 1982, Israel invaded the PLO’s stronghold in southern Lebanon. In addition to fighting Lebanese Phalange militia and Israeli troops, the PLO also found itself fighting the Syrian-supported Amal militia, which wanted to remove Arafat and place the PLO under different leadership. Arafat and the PLO withdrew and fled to Tunisia, where its power and influence steadily waned.

The withdrawal of the PLO produced a power vacuum, into which stepped a new force which would bring a new face to the Israeli/Palestine conflict. In 1979, a revolution led by radical Muslim extremists toppled the Shah of Iran and set up a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy under the direct control of the religious authorities. While the PLO had been secular and nationalist in its programs, now there appeared a new anti-Israel force—the radical Muslims. Paramilitary fundamentalist Islamic forces, most supported by the Iranian Ayatollahs, soon appeared everywhere; the largest and most important being the Hezbollah in Lebanon, which had the goal of expelling all foreign forces from Lebanon and placing the country under Islamic law. When the PLO fled Lebanon, it was Hezbollah that stepped in to play the leading role in the resistance, and when Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon in 1985, Hezbollah claimed the credit and became a hero to the Palestinian refugees. Soon, militant Islamic groups, modeled on Hezbollah, began replacing the PLO in the refugee camps. The most important of these was Hamas, formed in 1987.

In that same year, however, the struggle for a Palestinian homeland reached a turning point.  Until this point, the Palestinian campaign had consisted largely of guerrilla raids and terrorist attacks. In 1987, however, something completely unexpected happened—spontaneous mass uprisings and demonstrations broke out in the Occupied Territories, known as the Intifadah. Strikes broke out, boycotts and tax-protests were organized, unarmed demonstrators marched, and youths defiantly threw rocks at occupying Israeli forces. While both the PLO and Hamas tried to gain control over the uprising, the real leadership lay with local councils of people from many different factions. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising became the chief spokesmen. Israel responded with harsh repression and collective punishments, the UN condemned the large number of civilian deaths, and Israel, once viewed by the world as the innocent victim of Palestinian terrorist attacks, now came to be viewed as a brutal occupying power. It was a political turning point.

In Tunisia, the Palestine National Council, the de facto Palestine government-in-exile, issued a formal declaration of Palestinian independence, although it did not actually control any part of the Occupied Territories. Arafat announced that he would begin negotiations with Israel on the basis of a “two state solution”, in which a Palestinian state would be recognized in the Occupied Territories (a deal referred to by the Israelis as “land for peace”). After decades of depending on other Arab states for its diplomatic interests, the Palestine National Council now began secret bilateral negotiations directly with the Israeli government.  In 1993, after an exchange of letters formally recognizing Israel’s right to exist, Arafat signed the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”, known informally as “The Oslo Accords”. This agreement created a Palestine National Authority which would, step by step, be given the power to execute governmental authority over the Gaza Strip and West Bank as the Israelis withdrew in stages. The Interim agreement would last for five years, during which negotiations would continue for a permanent resolution of questions concerning the status of Jerusalem, the right of Arab refugees to return to their former homes in Israel, and the fate of the Jewish settlements in the territories. Side agreements in 1994 and 1995 spelled out the procedures for Israeli troop withdrawal from Jericho and the West Bank, and the transfer of power to the Palestinian Authority. In September 1995, these side agreements were replaced by the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, known as “The Oslo II Accords”, which divided the territories into three zones with varying degrees of control by the Palestine Authority.

The PLO now transformed itself into a political party, known as Fatah, and Yassir Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian Authority.

His rival was Hamas. By the year 2000, Hamas had grown far beyond a mere paramilitary group. It now also functioned as a social welfare organization and a quasi-government, setting up hospitals, schools and utilities in areas under its control. With the formation of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas began fielding candidates for political office.

Any hopes that the Oslo process would lead to lasting peace, however, were soon dashed.  In September 2000, a series of talks between the Palestine Authority and Israel broke down over the status of Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former lands in Israel if they choose. As a result, a Second Intifadah broke out, and this time it spread to Arabs living in Israel with Israeli citizenship. Far more violent than the first Intifadah had been, the Second Intifadah was believed by many in Israel (and some in the United States) to have been deliberately planned by Arafat and Fatah as a way of extracting concessions from Israel. As the violence dragged on, Israeli troops entered the Palestinian zones, and fighting broke out. The radical Muslim groups, especially Hamas, but also the smaller Islamic Jihad in Palestine group, gained in stature as the Fatah came more and more to be viewed as corrupt and weak. Open fighting between Hamas and Israeli troops, including ambushes, rocket attacks, and suicide bombings, dragged off and on for the next several years.

In 2003, the US, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations jointly offered a plan they called “The Road Map”, which they hoped would start the peace process anew. The Road Map proposal was almost immediately derailed, however, when the Palestinian Authority proved unable to stop Hamas attacks on Israel, which was the first step on the “road”. Israel, for its part, did not halt the expansion of its illegal settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, which was also called for in Phase One of the Road Map.

In 2004, Yassir Arafat died of natural causes, and the next year Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Palestinian Authority. Abbas concluded a truce between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority, and attempted to bring Hamas and Islamic Jihad to respect the truce, but Hamas attacks continued, and were widely seen as an attempt by the extremists to derail the peace process.

 In 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon shocked many in Israel by drawing up a plan for unilateral disengagement, in which all of the settlements and Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank would be withdrawn. Israel would still control Gaza’s borders, ports and airspace. At the same time, Sharon announced a plan to build a “security wall” around the West Bank. Because the wall did not follow the pre-1967 borders, but enclosed a significant amount of Occupied Territory, the UN declared it to be an illegal annexation of occupied territory. But in 2005, Sharon announced that, while Israel would disengage completely from the Gaza Strip, the wall would be built as planned around the West Bank—and Israel continued to illegally expand its Jewish settlements there. A similar wall was then also built around Gaza.  In November 2005, the US helped to broker an Agreement on Movement and Access to allow movement of supplies and food across these borders and between the West Bank and Gaza.

 In 2006, to the surprise of most observers, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Authority elections, and issued a political program calling for the return of all Palestinian lands, an Islamic Republic, and the right of armed self-defense.  Hamas also announced that it did not recognize the validity of the agreements that Fatah had signed with Israel.  In response, Israel, the United States and other countries responded by cutting off economic aid to Palestine. Tensions between Fatah and Hamas supporters increased, leading to open fighting in Gaza. After a time, Hamas and Fatah announced that they had formed a “unity government”, but factional fighting continued sporadically. In effect, Hamas had control of the Gaza Strip, and Fatah had control of the West Bank.

In 2007, Hamas began firing rockets at Israel from Gaza, and Israeli troops invaded, sealing off the border and cutting off supplies of food and equipment. The fighting didn’t end until Israeli forces withdrew from Gaza in January 2009.

After American President Barack Obama took office in 2009, some people hoped that the stalled peace process would begin anew. In June 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that Israel accepted the Road Map as a plan for peace, but that it would not halt the expansion of its settlements in the West Bank, as called for in all of the various peace proposals.

The peace process now stands in limbo.

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence (14 July 1915—10 March 1916) 

From Sharif Hussein, 14 July 1915

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is in the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them in the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;

And whereas it is to the Arabs’ interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographic position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;

For these reasons the Arab nation sees fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations:

Firstly. England will acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37^th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn ‘Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

Secondly. The Arab Government of the Sherif will acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly. For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties will offer mutual assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties.

Fourthly. If one of the parties enters into an aggressive conflict, the other party will assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly. England will acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and will assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly. Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty will remain in vigour for fifteen years, and, if either wishes it to be renewed, one year’s notice before lapse of treaty is to be given.

Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God) agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object, they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively in a period of thirty days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif’s family) will consider ourselves free in work and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Effendi.

From McMahon to Hussein, August 30, 1915

To his Highness the Sherif Hussein.

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity of your feeling towards England. We rejoice, moreover, that your Highness and your people are of one opinion—that Arab interests are English interests and English Arab. To this intent we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener’s message, which reached you by the hand of Ali Effendi, and in which was stated clearly our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Khalifate when it should be proclaimed. We declare once more that His Majesty’s Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race. With regard to the questions of limits and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective occupation; especially as we have learned, with surprise and regret, that some of the Arabs in those very parts, far from assisting us, are neglecting this their supreme opportunity and are lending their arms to the German and the Turk, to the new despoiler and the old oppressor.

Nevertheless, we are ready to send your Highness for the Holy Cities and the noble Arabs the charitable offerings of Egypt so soon as your Highness shall inform us how and where they should be delivered. We are, moreover, arranging for this your messenger to be admitted and helped on any journey he may make to ourselves.

Friendly reassurances. Salutations!

(Signed) A. H. McMAHON.

From Hussein to McMahon, September 9, 1915

To his Excellency the Most Exalted, the Most Eminent—the British High Commissioner in Egypt; may God grant him Success.

With great cheerfulness and delight I received your letter dated the 19^th Shawal, 1333 (the 30^th August, 1915), and have given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point.

It is necessary to make clear to your Excellency our sincerity towards the illustrious British Empire and our confession of preference for it in all cases and matters and under all forms and circumstances. The real interests of the followers of our religion necessitate this.

Nevertheless, your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coolness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling them, &c., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this.

Therefore, they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire.

Their reason for this union and confidence is mutual interest, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions and the feelings of their inhabitants, so that they may know how to base their future and life, so not to meet her or any of her Allies in opposition to their resolution which would produce a contrary issue, which God forbid.

For the object is, honourable Minister, the truth which is established on a basis which guarantees the essential sources of life in future.

Yet within these limits they have not included places inhabited by a foreign race. It is a vain show of words and titles.

May God have mercy on the Khalifate and comfort Moslems in it.

I am confident that your Excellency will not doubt that it is not I personally who am demanding of these limits which include only our race, but that they are all proposals of the people, who, in short, believe that they are necessary for economic life.

Is this not right, your Excellency the Minister?

In a word, your high Excellency, we are firm in our sincerity and declaring our preference for loyalty towards you, whether you are satisfied with us, as has been said, or angry.

With reference to your remark in your letter above mentioned that some of our people are still doing their utmost in promoting the interests of Turkey, your goodness would not permit you to make this an excuse for the tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our demands, demands which I cannot admit that you, as a man of sound opinion, will deny to be necessary for our existence; nay, they are the essential essence of our life, material and moral.

Up to the present moment I am myself with all my might carrying out in my country all things in conformity with the Islamic law, all things which tend to benefit the rest of the Kingdom, and I shall continue to do so until it pleases God to order otherwise.

In order to reassure your Excellency I can declare that the whole country, together with those who you say are submitting themselves to Turco-German orders, are all waiting the result of these negotiations, which are dependent only on your refusal or acceptance of the question of the limits and on your declaration of safeguarding their religion first and then the rest of rights from any harm or danger.

Whatever the illustrious Government of Great Britain finds conformable to its policy on this subject, communicate it to us and specify to us the course we should follow.

In all cases it is only God’s will which shall be executed, and it is God who is the real factor in everything.

With regard to our demand for grain for the natives, and the moneys known to the Wakfs’ Ministry and all other articles sent here with pilgrims’ caravans, high Excellency, my intention in this matter is to confirm your proclamations to the whole world, and especially to the Moslem world, that your antagonism is confined only to the party which has usurped the rights of the Khalifate in which are included the rights of all Moslems.

Moreover the said grain is from the special Wakfs and has nothing to do with politics.

If you think it should be, let the grain of the two years be transported in a special steamer to Jedda in an official manner, in the name of all the natives as usual, and the captain of the steamer or the special “Mamur” detailed as usual every year to hand it over on his arrival at the port will send to the Governor of Jedda asking for the Mamur of the grain at Jedda or a responsible official to take over the grain and give the necessary receipt signed by the said Mamur, that is the Mamur of the grain himself. He should make it a condition that he would not accept any receipt but that signed by this Mamur.

Let the captain of the steamer or the “Mamur” (detailed with the grain) be instructed that if he finds anything contrary to this arrangement he should warn them that he will return home with the cargo. Thereupon the Mamur and the special committee detailed with him, which is known as the committee of the grain for the natives, will take over the grain in the proper form.

Please accept my best regards and salutations.

If you choose to send a reply to this, please send it with the bearer. 29^th Shawal, 1333.

From Sir Henry McMahon, 24 October 1915

I have received your letter of the 29^th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

1. Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

2. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

3. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

4. On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

5. With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letter which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

Letter from Hussein to McMahon, November 5, 1915

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

To his Excellency the most exalted and eminent Minister who is endowed with the highest authority and soundness of opinion.

May God guide him to do His Will!

I received with great pleasure your honoured letter, dated the 15^th Zil Hijja (the 24^th October, 1915), to which I beg to answer as follows:

1. In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships-seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain-we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather.

We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful Omar ibn Khattab, and other Khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in the laws of the Moslem Faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they treat themselves. He, Omar, declared with reference to Christians: “They will have the same privileges and submit to the same duties as ourselves.” They will thus enjoy their civic rights in as much as it accords with the general interests of the whole nation.

2. As the Iraqi vilayets are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom, and were in fact the seat of its Government in the time of Ali ibn Abu Talib, and in the time of all the Khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns were the first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great; therefore they are greatly valued by all Arabs far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently, we cannot satisfy the Arab nations or make them submit to give us such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British administration for a short time those districts now occupied by the British troops without the rights of either party being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab nation; which interests are to it economic and vital), and against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation, in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to support; at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential.

3. In your desire to hasten the movement we see not only advantages, but grounds of apprehension. The first of these grounds is the fear of the blame of the Moslems of the opposite party (as has already happened in the past), who would declare that we have revolted against Islam and ruined its forces. The second is that, standing in the face of Turkey which is supported by all the forces of Germany, we do not know what Great Britain and her Allies would do if one of the Entente Powers were weakened and obliged to make peace. We fear that the Arab nation will then be left alone in the face of Turkey together with her allies, but we would not at all mind if we were to face the Turks alone. Therefore it is necessary to take these points into consideration in order to avoid a peace being concluded in which the parties concerned may decide the fate of our people as if we had taken part in the war without making good our claims to official consideration.

4. The Arab nation has a strong belief that after this war is over the Turks under German influence will direct their efforts to provoke the. Arabs and violate their rights, both material and moral, to wipe out their nobility and honour and reduce them to utter submission as they are determined to ruin them entirely. The reasons for the slowness shown in our action have already been stated.

5. When the Arabs know the Government of Great Britain is their ally who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace in the face of Turkey and Germany, and that she will support and will effectively defend them, then to enter the war at once will, no doubt, be in conformity with the general interest of the Arabs.

6. Our letter dated the 29^th Shaual, 1333 (the 9^th September, 1915), saves us the trouble of repeating our opinions as to articles 3 and 4 of your honoured last letter regarding administration, Government advisers and officials, especially as you have declared, exalted Minister, that you will not interfere with internal affairs.

7. The arrival of a clear and definite answer as soon as possible to the above proposals is expected. We have done our utmost in making concessions in order to come to an agreement satisfying both parties. We know that our lot in this war will be either a success, which will guarantee to the Arabs a life becoming their past history, or destruction in the attempt to attain their objects. Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects, I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain, but they, the Arabs, have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end.

May God keep you safe and victorious, as we devoutly hope and desire.

27^th Zil Hijja, 1333.

Letter from McMahon to Hussein, December 14, 1915

I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the districts of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of the Arab territories.

I also note with great pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are determined to act in conformity with the precepts laid down by Omar Ibn Khattab and the early Khalifs, which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike.

In stating that the Arabs are ready to recognise and respect all our treaties with Arab chiefs, it is, of course, understood that this will apply to all territories included in the Arab Kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain cannot repudiate engagements which already exist.

With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood and taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab Kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the urgency of these negotiations permit.

We fully appreciate your desire for caution, and have no wish to urge you to hasty action, which might jeopardise the eventual success of your projects, but, in the meantime, it is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies.

It is on the success of these efforts and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause, when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend.

Under these circumstances I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition.

As an earnest of our intentions, and in order to aid you in your efforts in our joint cause, I am sending you by your trustworthy messenger a sum of twenty thousand pounds.

 (Signed) H. McMAHON.

Letter from Hussein to McMahon, January 1, 1916

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

To his Excellency the eminent, energetic and magnanimous Minister.

We received from the bearer your letter, dated the 9^th Safar (the 14^th December, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood its contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which had made me uneasy.

Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed Faroki Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position our people have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour’s special attention and consideration.

With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning El Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfill those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts.

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peaceful conditions. In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

I declare this, and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you give in the conclusion of your honoured letter. Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.

Your expression “we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might jeopardise the success of your aim” does not need any more explanation except what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c.

I deem this sufficient, as I have occupied much of your Honour’s time. I beg to offer you my great veneration and respect.

25^th Safar, 1334.

Letter from McMahon to Hussein, January 25, 1916

We have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25^th Safar (the 1^st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us your verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare.

We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Baghdad, and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives.

As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.

In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all.

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs over to our joint cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment for further and more decided measures.

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which we can assist you and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies. Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided followers.

We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also bring to you all our news.

With salaams.

(Signed) H. McMAHON.

Letter from Hussein to McMahon, February 18, 1916

In the name of the Merciful, the Compassionate!

To the most noble His Excellency the High Commissioner. May God protect Vim. After compliments and respects.

We received your Excellency’s letter dated 25^th Rabi El Awal, and its contents filled us with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction at the attainment of the required understanding and the intimacy desired. I ask God to make easy our purposes and prosper our endeavours. Your Excellency will understand the work that is being done, and the reasons for it from the following:

Firstly. We had informed your Excellency that we had sent one of our sons to Syria to command the operations deemed necessary there. We have received a detailed report from him stating that the tyrannies of the Government there have not left of the persons upon whom they could depend, whether of the different ranks of soldiers or of others, save only a few, and those of secondary importance; and that he is awaiting the arrival of the forces announced from different places, especially from the people of the country and the surrounding Arab regions as Aleppo and the south of Mosul, whose total is calculated at not less than 100,000 by their estimate; and he intends, if the majority of the forces mentioned are Arab, to begin the movement by them; and, if otherwise, that is, of the Turks or others, he will observe their advance to the Canal, and when they begin to fight, his movements upon them will be different to what they expect.

Secondly. We purposed sending our eldest son to Medina with sufficient forces to strengthen his brother who is in Syria, and with every possibility of occupying the railway line, or carrying out such operations as circumstances may admit. This is the beginning of the principal movement, and we are satisfied in its beginning with what he had levied as guards to keep the interior of the country quiet; they are of the people of Hejaz only, for many reasons, which it would take too long to set forth; chiefly the difficulties in the way of providing their necessities with secrecy and speed (although this precaution was not necessary) and to make it easy to bring reinforcements when needed; this is the summary of what you wished to understand. In my opinion it is sufficient, and it is to be taken as a foundation and a standard as to our actions in the face of all changes and unforeseen events which the sequence of events may show. It remains for us to state what we need at present:

Firstly. The amount of #50,000 in gold for the monthly pay of the troops levied, and other things the necessity of which needs no explanation. We beg you to send it with all possible haste.

Secondly. 20,000 sacks of rice, 15,000 sacks of flour, 3,000 sacks of barley, 150 sacks of coffee, 150 sacks of sugar, 5,000 rifles of the modern pattern and the necessary ammunition, and 100 boxes of the two sample cartridges (enclosed) and of Martini-Henry cartridges and “Aza,” that is those of the rifles of the factory of St. Etienne in France, for the use of those two kinds of rifles of our tribes; it would not be amiss to send 500 boxes of both kinds.

Thirdly. We think it better that the place of deposit of all these things should be Port Sudan.

Fourthly. As the above provisions and munitions are not needed until the beginning of the movement (of which we will inform you officially), they should remain at the above place, and when we need them we will inform the Governor there of the place to which they may be conveyed, and of the intermediaries who will carry orders for receiving them.

Fifthly. The money required should be sent at once to the Governor of Port Sudan, and a confidential agent will be sent by us to receive it, either all at once, or in two installments, according as he is able, and this (S) is the (secret) sign to be recognized for accepting the man.

Sixthly. Our envoy who will receive the money will be sent to Port Sudan in three weeks’ time, that is to say, he will be there on the 5^th Jamad Awal (9^th March) with a letter from us addressed to Al Khawaga Elias Effendi, saying that he (Elias) will pay him, in accordance with the letter, the rent of our properties, and the signature will be clear in our name, but we will instruct him to ask for the Governor of the place, whom you will apprise of this person’s arrival. After perusal of the letter, the money should be given to him on condition that no discussion whatever is to be made with him of any question concerning us. We beg you most emphatically not to tell him anything, keeping this affair secret, and he should be treated apparently as if he were nothing out of the way.

Let it not be thought that our appointment of another man results from lack of confidence in the bearer; it is only to avoid waste of time, for we are appointing him to a task elsewhere. At the same time we beg you not to embark or send him in a steamer, or officially, the means already arranged being sufficient.

Seventhly. Our representative, bearer of the present letter, has been definitely instructed to ensure the arrival of this, and I think that his mission this time is finished since the condition of things is known both in general and in detail, and there is no need for sending anyone else. In case of need for sending information, it will come from us; yet as our next representative will reach you after three weeks, you may prepare instructions for him to take back. Yet let him be treated simply in appearance.

Eighthly. Let the British Government consider this military expenditure in accordance with the books which will be furnished it, explaining how the money has been spent.

To conclude, my best and numberless salutations beyond all increase.

14 Rabi al Akhar, 1334.

Letter from McMahon to Hussein, March 10, 1916

We have received your letter of the 14^th Rabi el Akhar (the 18^th February), duly delivered by your trusted messenger.

We are grateful to note the active measures which you propose to take. We consider them the most suitable in the existing circumstances, and they have the approval of His Majesty’s Government. I am pleased to be able to inform you that His Majesty’s Government have approved of meeting your requests, and that which you asked to be sent with all haste is being despatched with your messenger, who is also the bearer of this letter.

The remainder will be collected as quickly as possible and will be deposited at Port Sudan, where it will remain until we hear from you officially of the beginning of the movement and of the places to which they may be conveyed and the intermediaries who will carry out the orders for receiving them.

The necessary instructions, as set forth in your letter, have been issued to the Governor at Port Sudan, and he will arrange everything in accordance with your wishes.

Your representative who brought your last letter has been duly facilitated in his journey to Jeizan, and every assistance has been given him in his mission, which we trust will be crowned with good results.

We have arranged that, on completion, he will be brought to Port Sudan, whence he will proceed by the safest means to join you and report the results of his work.

We take the opportunity, in sending this letter, to explain to you a matter which might otherwise not have been clear to you, and which might have given rise to misunderstanding. There are various Turkish posts and small garrisons along the coasts of Arabia who are hostile to us, and who are said to be planning injury to our naval interests in the Red Sea. We may, therefore, find it necessary to take hostile measures against these posts and garrisons, but we have issued strict instructions that every care must be taken by our ships to differentiate between the hostile Turkish garrisons and the innocent Arab inhabitants, towards whom we entertain such friendly feelings.

We give you notice of this matter in case distorted and false reports may reach you of the reasons for any action which we may be obliged to take.

We have heard rumours that our mutual enemies are endeavouring to construct boats for the purpose of laying mines in the Red Sea, and of otherwise injuring our interests there, and we beg of you that you will give us early information should you receive any confirmation of such reports.

We have heard that Ibn Rashid has been selling large quantities of camels to the Turks, which are being sent up to Damascus.

We hope that you will be able to use influence with him in order that he may cease from this practice and, if he still persists, that you will be able to arrange for the Arabs who lie between him and Syria to seize the camels as they pass, a procedure which will be to our mutual advantage.

I am glad to be able to inform you that those misguided Arabs under Sayed Ahmed el Senussi, who have fallen victims to the wiles of Turkish and German intriguers, are now beginning to see the error of their ways, and are coming in to us in large numbers, asking for forgiveness and friendship.

We have severely defeated the forces which these intriguers had collected against us, and the eyes of the Arabs are now becoming open to the deceit which has been practiced upon them.

The capture of Erzerum, and the defeats sustained by the Turks in the Caucasus, are having a great effect in our favour, and are greatly helping the cause for which we are both working.

We ask God to prosper your endeavors and to further the work which you have taken in hand.

In conclusion, we beg you to accept our warmest salutations and expressions of friendship.

Jamad Awwal, 1334.

(Signed) A. H. McMAHON